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The paper analyses the potential for introducing a Park&Buy service in the city of Pesaro (Italy) along 
the lines of the pilot project introduced in Siena, Italy, in 2004. It attempts to empirically evaluate the 
preferences of the parties involved and derives some suggestions on the potential compromise solution 
via a specifically designed stated preference experiment, drawing from the literature on interactive agency 
discrete choice modelling. Although various theoretical and methodological issues are still open for 
discussion, the methodology proves useful in giving insights not only on the parties’ preference structure 
- as normally achieved by discrete choice models - but also on shopkeepers perception of customers’ 
preferences, on the room for bargaining, on each party’s influence on choice attributes and on the 
determinants of the probability of achieving a comprise solution. 
 






City centers, especially historic ones, suffer from lack of space to accommodate 
traffic and parking of private cars. City administrators often restrict motor vehicle 
access to city centers in order to preserve their aesthetic quality and to reduce 
congestion and pollution. While these policies support some activities (leisure activities, 
tourism, etc.), shopkeepers situated within the city center often oppose to traffic 
restrictions on the grounds that they favor shops and malls equipped with large parking 
facilities located outside the city boundaries. 
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Policies aimed at reducing private car traffic are often accompanied by those limiting 
or regulating freight vehicle access to city centers. In Europe this set of policies is 
defined by the concept of city logistics, since its objective is to optimize goods 
distribution in an urban area.  
Various city logistics proposals have been advanced (see e.g. Bestuf, Cityports, 
CityFreights projects, LT Consultants and BCI, 2002; Egger and Ruesch, 2004; 
Panebianco and Zanarini, 2005) and a number of pilot projects have been implemented. 
An interesting one is the Park&Buy (P&B) service implemented in Siena for two weeks 
in 2004 within the eDRUL project (funded by the 5th Framework Programme)1. It aims 
at improving the accessibility to visitors and tourists to the 750 shops located within the 
city centre. Due to access restriction, in fact, visitors and tourist, contrarily to residents, 
can only park their vehicles in the parking lots located outside the city centre. The P&B 
service allows the customers of these shops to have their purchases delivered to the 
parking facilities or to their hotels.  
During the two-week test the parcels of 10 shops located in the centre of Siena were 
delivered by a transport operator2 to the parking lot “Il Campo”3. The P&B service 
order was processed by the shopkeeper and was forwarded to the e-DRUL Agency (via 
a web portal or by phone) which notified it to the transport operator and to the customer. 
When the parcel was delivered to the pick-up point the consumer was informed via as 
SMS.  
The P&B service tested in Siena showed two important advantages (Ambrosino et al., 
2005a): (a) the efficient management of the freight traffic from the city centre to areas 
outside the restricted zone; (b) the increased attractiveness of the shops located in the 
Traffic Limited Zone (TLZ) and, in particular, of those located farther away from the 
parking lots.  
The P&B system is similar to other home delivery services provided in France by 
shops and supermarkets associated to the Nanterre PAD, in Belgium by the Delhaize 
supermarkest, in UK by TESCO, in Switzerland by the online supermarket LeShop 
(Egger and Ruesch, 2004), or by other pick-up point organizations such as Tower24 in 
Dortmund, DHL PackStation in Koln, Cityssimo and E-Box in Paris4. This city logistics 
innovation seems particularly suitable for Italian and European cities centers 
characterized by TLZs, good public transport accessibility and high commercial 
attractiveness. Moreover, it is in line with BESTUFS recommendations (Huschebeck 
and Allen, 2006) stressing the attractiveness of pick-up point services compared to 
traditional home delivery services and underlining the importance of information and 
communication technology (ICT). 
However P&B raises some economic and distributive issues too. For instance, who 
should pay for the service? Shopkeepers, customers, or both? In which proportion5? 
How quickly should the parcels be deliveded at the parking lot? How frequent should 
the service be? Should the parcels be delivered on request to other destinations (e.g. 
home delivery)? And who should pay for that extra-service? Should the service be 
organized using information technology or not? 
                                                 
1
 See the website http://srvweb01.softeco.it/edrul/  
2
 CO.TA.S. (Consorzio Tassisti Senesi, www.cotas.it) 
3
 operated by SienaParcheggi as a business-to-customer (B2C) freight pick-up point 
4
 For more information see Egger and Ruesch, 2004or visit www.bestufs.net  
5
 In Siena the P&B service cost was estimated to be between 3 to 5 € per parcel (including transport and 
order management cost) but the shopkeepers were willing to pay only 2 € per parcel. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 42 (2009): 26-46 
 28 
We believe that it would be useful to answer to these questions and to predict if and 
under which conditions the P&B system could be successfully implemented in Italy. It 
seems to us, indeed, that the technological feasibility of the service is less critical than 
the lack of willingness of shopkeepers, customers and the city administrators to 
participate to the project and to share its costs and risks.  
Shopkeepers, first and foremost, are the ones who should be actively involved in 
organizing the service. However, in a city center, there are numerous types of shops 
(groceries, domestic appliance shops, clothing departments, jewelry stores, bookstores, 
furniture stores, etc. ) and it is quite likely that they would benefit differently from the 
new service. It is to be expected, then, that they would be differently willing to 
participate to the project. It sould be noted that the Siena pilot experiment was funded 
by the City Council and the European Union, but that, in order to be financially 
sustainable,  should be fully supported and properly financed by the local business 
community. 
Customers, who are likely to benefit from the new service, need to actually use it and, 
at least partially, to pay for it. However, similarly to shopkeepers, different customers 
will differently benefit from its implementation and, hence, their interest and 
willingness to pay for it is likely to differ. Whether and how much customers are willing 
to be involved in the project is a matter which needs to be evaluated empirically. 
Finally, city administrators should encourage, promote and guarantee the conditions 
needed for the service to be successful, including the initial financing of the project and 
the setup of the regulatory framework within which the new service will take place. The 
city will benefit from the P&B service as long as the related traffic restraint policies will 
be accepted and the attractiveness of the city center will be enhanced. Indeed, a 
successful historical center is likely to raise real estate values and provide higher local 
tax revenue. 
Because there are many different actors which would be involved in the new service 
and because they have quite different interests, formal and informal bargaining is likely 
to take place among them. The interacting feature of the bargaining process, although, is 
quite difficult to be analyzed at the theoretical, methodological and statistical level.  
Since the aim of our research is to forecast agents’ future demand for P&B service 
and to account for the bargaining process taking place among the main actors deciding 
if and how to implement it, we based our research on an interactive discrete-choice 
modelling framework originally conceived by D. Hensher and his associates at ITSL, 
University of Sidney (Hensher et al., 2007a).  
The first part of the paper (Section 2 and 3) is focused on the theoretical and 
methodological issues involved in the analysis of interactive decision making processes, 
while the second part (Sections 3 and 4) describes our case study and the descriptive 
and the econometric results we have obtained, finally Section 5 provides some 
conclusions and lists our future research lines on this topic. 
 
 
2. Theoretical and methodological issues in the study of social interaction 
 
Interaction between agents takes place in many ways. At one end of the spectrum, 
agents interact in decision making as members of an institution (e.g., a family or a firm). 
They are bound by sentimental or contractual relationships and take some decisions 
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jointly, after formal or informal group discussion. These decisions can be classified as 
group decisions and can be modelled as group choices. An incomplete list of papers on 
group choice modelling includes Molin et al. (1997), Arora and Allenby (1999), 
Aribarg et al. (2002), Gliebe and Koppelman (2002, 2005), Zhang et al. (2005, 2006a, 
2006b), Dosman and Adamowicz (2006), Puckett and Hensher (2006). 
On the other end of the spectrum, there are individual decisions (e.g., individual 
consumption decisions) which, although taken without consulting other agents, entail an 
element of social interaction, since they are taken in a social environment (involving, 
e.g., imitation, image setting, peers’ opinions). Relevan literature on individual choice 
modelling with social interactions includes Durlauf (2001), Brock and Durlauf (2001, 
2003), Kooreman and Soetevent (2002), Hartmann and Yildiz (2007), Kooreman 
(1994), Brewer and Hensher (2000) and Paglione (2007).  
Most business decisions, indeed, take into account other agents’ preferences. 
Sometimes this is only implicit (e.g. in setting the price for a product a shopkeeper takes 
into account his clients’ preferences), in other cases there is an actual bargaining process 
taking place via an explicit interaction among the buyer and the seller. During the 
bargaining process each agent might decide to either cooperate, that is “to play the 
game” or not to do so, that is “to exit the game”.  
An agent has an interest in playing the game only if s\he perceives that finding an 
agreement generates an improvement in her\his welfare compared with the no 
agreement situation. Each agent might propose a deal to split the gain, while the other 
agent might accept it, make a counter-proposal or exit the game. Entering a game and 
leaving it without reaching an agreement might entail a monetary or an opportunity cost. 
We assume that a similar relationship exists between the shopkeeper and his 
customers when the P&B service is considered6. Such a relationship could be 
conceptualized as an interaction between two parties which takes the following steps. 
The shopkeeper designs the service in order to please customers and attract more 
business. The service will have certain technical characteristics (in terms of frequency 
of delivery at the parking lot, use of information technology and so on) and certain costs 
that need to be financed by the two parties7. The shopkeeper will propose a certain cost 
distribution to the customers. The customers might accept the proposal and use the new 
service or might refuse it. 
Taking into account this interaction process is important to enhance the realism of any 
model describing the potential demand for a new logistic service involving more than 
one actor, indeed our aim is to develop an operational model that can describe the 
bargaining area of the agents potentially involved in the P&B system, that is 
shopkeepers and customers, that can estimate the values at stake and that can predict 
which service set up would be most probably accepted by those actors. 
Since the decisions taken by shopkeepers and by their customers determine the 
success or failure of the P&B service, it is useful to analyse how their preferences might 
interact in determining the acceptability and the success of this service. In this respect a 
promising research framework is the inter-agency choice modelling, otherwise stated 
group decision modelling. Within this literature a common representation of the 
                                                 
6
 In the remaining of the paper we abstract, for the sake of simplicity, from the role played by the city 
administration and from interactions taking place among shopkeepers in deciding how to set up and 
finance the service. 
7
 There is also a potential contribution from public subsidies motivated by improved attractiveness of the 
city centre and local taxed revenues. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 42 (2009): 26-46 
 30 
interaction process involving two parties is described by the following equation [Arora 
and Allenby, 1999; Aribarg et al., 2002; Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006; Zhang, et al. 
2005, 2006a, 2006b]: 
 
( )1j j j jd sk sk k sk ck kU X Xτ β τ β ε= + − +  (1) 
 
Equation (1) describes the utility that a hypothetical dyad d, made up by two agents 
(the shopkeeper s and the customer c), derives from choosing an alternative j (where  
j = 1…J) as a weighted sum of the utilities of each agent, with the weights represented 
by the parameters τ  and (1 - τ). Notice that even if both agents choose the same 
alternative j, each of them experience different marginal (dis)utilities8 associated with it, 
given the fact that each of them has different preferences, represented by the agent-
specific β’s. The parameters τ and (1 - τ) are the weights that multiply the agents’ 
marginal utilities and represent the relative influence that each agent exerts in the final 
group choice. 
The additive formulation of the systematic component of the utility function of the 
two agents equation (1) assume cardinal and interpersonally comparable utility 
functions as theoretically advocated by Harsanyi (1955). This is a crucial assumption 
discussed at length in public choice literature (see, e.g., Mueller, 1989), with little 
support in normative economics but, in our opinion, it is still a useful modeling tool 
given the positive approach adopted in this paper. 
Notice also that equation (1) includes the specific assumptions made in most studies 
(Arora and Allenby, 1999; Aribarg, et al., 2002; Puckett and Hensher, 2006) that each 
agent has an attribute-specific influence, implying that there are as many τ parameter as 
the number of attributes included in the model.  
Drawing from the modelling frameworks proposed David Hensher and his associates 
at ITSL (Sidney) like the Interactive Agency Choice Experiment (IACE, see Brewer 
and Hensher, 2000Rose and Hensher, 2004), the Minimum Information Group 
Inference (MIGI, see Hensher andPuckett , 2006), and the Stated Endogenous Attribute 
Level (SEAL(Puckett et al.2007) we developed a methodology comprising the 
following 4 steps. 
First, a selection of relevant attributes for the P&B service is identified by the 
research group on the bases of literature review and of focus groups discussions 
involving shopkeepers. These attributes are used to design the P&B alternatives to be 
administered to the shopkeepers and to their customers during a stated preference choice 
exercise.  
Second, during the interview each shopkeeper is asked to make two proposals on the 
cost distribution and technical characteristics of the service (Table 1): a) the one s\he 
prefers the most and b) the one s\he deems most preferred by his\her customers. 
Alternatively, the shopkeeper may decide not to make any proposal if s\he deems it not 
worth for his\her business. This second step provides us with information on the 
shopkeeper’s preferred alternative and on his\her perception of his\her customers’ 
preferred alternative. It also produces a customization of the choice experiment 
                                                 
8
 The possibility that the β’s attached to each attribute represents a marginal utility or disutility depends 
on the nature of the attributes considered (goods or bads).  
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similarly to the SEAL methodology9, whereas in the IACE methodology attribute levels 
are set and fixed by the analyst. 
Table 1: An example of choice tasks submitted during the stated preference exercise. 
Under your point of view a Park-and-Buy service (delivering parcels to the parking lot) would 
make sense for your business? If, yes, which characteristics should it have? 
Attributes Alternative A* Alternative B* None of the two is 
convenient to me 
Cost per parcel to be 
charged to the shopkeeper € 2 € 3.6 - 
Cost per parcel to be 
charged to the customer € 2.2 € 0.8 - 
Maximum delivery time at the 
parking lot 90’ 150’ - 
Use of information 
technology Yes No - 
Destinations other than the 
parking lot Not available 
Available, charging 
the extra cost to the 
customer 
- 
Preferred alternative by the 
shopkeeper ** - - - 
Preferred alternative by the 
customer with no knowledge 
on shopkeeper’s preference§ 
- - - 
Would the client accept the 
alternative chosen by the 
shopkeeper? ** 
- - - 
Notes: * During the second step A stays for: “This is in my view the optimal solution for my business” 
and B stays for: “This is, in my view, the optimal solution taking the point of view of my customers”. 
During the third step A stays for: “Alternative A” and B stays for: “Alternative B”. 
** This part of the task is used only during the third stap of the interview. 
 
The third step consists in designing and administering to the shopkeeper 13 choice 
tasks including two hypothetical profiles that are pivoted orthogonal variations of the 
P&B alternative chosen by the shopkeeper himself during the previous step and the non-
choice option.  
As a forth step the choice experiment used for the shopkeeper interview is 
administered to his\her customers. They are asked to choose among the alternatives in 
the same 13 choice tasks proposed to the shopkeeper without knowing the shopkeeper’s 
choice. Then the shopkeeper’s choice is revealed to the customers and they are asked 
whether they would accept or not the shopkeeper’s choice. 
This methodology can be thought as an application of an Ultimatum Bargain Game 
where one player makes a proposal on how to share the surplus of a cooperative 
interaction with the other player, or in our case how to set up the P&B service, while the 
other player can only accept the proposal or refuse it, ending in this way the game with 
no gains for both agents. 
                                                 
9
 With no revision of the starting preference on the basis of a second agent counter-proposal as performed 
within the SEAL methodology.  
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A further possibility, although we have not implemented it yet, would have been to go 
back to the shopkeeper, show his\her customers’ choices and ask him\her to reconsider 
his\her choices. 
The data collected during the third and fourth step from the shopkeepers and from 
their customers can be analysed via a nested logit model (Figure 1) where each agent 
can choose either to participate to the service or not to do so. In the former case the 
agent can chose between two P&B alternatives. 
 
Figure 1: The nested structure of the choice model. 
 
Since there is no actual joint choice, in order to study what the shopkeeper-customer 
group choice would be we use the initial pass power model developed in the MIGI 
methodology by Hensher and Puckett (2006). The estimated coefficients of the choice 
model of each party are used as constant exogenous terms specifying the initial pass 
power model, and are multiplied by the corresponding attribute levels of the K attributes 
of each hypothetical j alternative. For each simulated group interaction, the alternative 
designated as the choice is the combination of the stated choices of the two parties. 
In a three-choice set up the model looks as follows: 
 
U11 = α11 + τ sk ⋅ βsk( )' ⋅ x1k + 1 − τ sk( )⋅ βck( )' ⋅ x1k + ε11
U12 = α12 + τ sk ⋅ βsk( )' ⋅ x1k + 1 − τ sk( )⋅ βck( )' ⋅ x2k + ε12
U13 = α13 + τ sk ⋅ βsk( )' ⋅ x1k + 1 − τ sk( )⋅ βck( )' ⋅ x3k + ε13
U 21 = α 21 + τ sk ⋅ βsk( )' ⋅ x2k + 1− τ sk( )⋅ βck( )' ⋅ x1k + ε21
U 22 = α 22 + τ sk ⋅ βsk( )' ⋅ x2k + 1− τ sk( )⋅ βck( )' ⋅ x2k + ε22
U 23 = α 23 + τ sk ⋅ βsk( )' ⋅ x2k + 1− τ sk( )⋅ βck( )' ⋅ x3k + ε23
U 31 = α 31 + τ sk ⋅ βsk( )' ⋅ x3k + 1 − τ sk( )⋅ βck( )' ⋅ x1k + ε31
U 32 = α 32 + τ sk ⋅ βsk( )' ⋅ x3k + 1 − τ sk( )⋅ βck( )' ⋅ x2k + ε32
U 33 = α 33 + τ sk ⋅ βsk( )' ⋅ x3k + 1 − τ sk( )⋅ βck( )' ⋅ x3k + ε33
 (2) 
Alternative B Alternative A 
Accept to use 
the P&B service 
Do not accept to use 
the P&B service 
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This is the complete power model. When restricting the model to agreement cases, the 
model reduces to the subset of equations in which alternative j is identical for both 
agents (i.e., both choose 1, both choose 2, or both choose 3). Hensher claims that the 
focus of group decision making modeling should be on both studying (i) the full set of 
group preferences; and (ii) the agreement outcomes only. The former specification is 
particularly useful in investigating potential barriers to agreement (as shown in Brewer 
and Hensher 2000). 
As a generalization of model (1) Zhang et al. (2005) proposed a specification of the 
group utility function termed the multi-linear group utility function: 
 
 













Where wi is member i’s weight parameter, and wi1i2,…… w1-n are the intra-household 
interaction parameters. This model assumes that household utility can be derived by 
weighting the utilities of the individual household members, and adding interaction 
effects. The weight wi can be interpreted as a measure of a member's power or influence 
over the group decision-making. The interaction parameters wi1i2,…… w1-n moderate the 
power effect and reflect the group members’ concern for achieving equality of utilities. 
The larger the interaction parameter, the higher the group’s collective desire to choose 
an allocation such that the utilities of all household members tend to be equal. We test if 
the specification (3) of the utility function of the group is superior to specification (1).  
 
 
3. Sample description and descriptive results 
 
The city of Pesaro (together with the city of Urbino) is one of the main towns of 
Marche region, which is located in the centre of Italy. We interviewed 21 shops located 
in the city centre of Pesaro, specifically: 5 shops selling clothing, 8 groceries, 1 
bookshop, 1 footware, 1 optician, 3 shops selling home furnishing, 1 textiles and 1 
underwear. The sample used for the econometric analysis reduced to 19 shops due to the 
fact that 2 of the shopkeepers (the optician and the one selling underwear) stated that 
they were not interested in the implementation of the P&B service. 
The analysis of the information stated by the shopkeepers during the second step of 
the research (which are described in figure 2) shows that they are willing, on average, to 
accept a cost equal to 0.68 Euro per consignment. 7 of them do not accept any charge, 
while 2 shopkeepers would accept a 2 Euro charge. 
On average shopkeepers propose to charge their customers  1.39 Euro per 
consignment, ranging from a minimum of 0.5 Euro to a maximum of 3 Euros. 
All but one shopkeeper would prefer to use information technology (either computer 
based or portable cellular phones) to process and monitor the service. 7 of them do not 
consider desirable to extend the service destination beyond the parking area, while 12 
think that home delivery is a desirable feature but that their customers should be 
charged for the extra-service. 








Figure 3: P&B cost sharing and frequency. 
 
The bargaining process between shopkeepers and customers relatively to the P&B 
cost sharing and the maximum delivery time at the parking lot is depicted in Figure 3 
showing that: 
 
a) Costs to be borne by shopkeepers. On average, in the first task, shopkeepers stated 
that they would accept to pay 68 Eurocents per parcel as a contribution to the P&B 
service (first row and first column of table 1, choice task 1) and that their customers 
would most likely want them to contribute a cost equal to 176 Eurocents (first row and 
second column of table 1, choice task 1). But in the subsequent choice tasks (generated 
as orthogonal variations from the first base case), shopkeepers choose alternatives that 
make them pay on average 71 Eurocents, slightly more than what stated in the first task. 
How much do customers think shopkeepers should contribute to the P&B cost 
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financing? The interviewees stated that they would accept to use the P&B service if 
shopkeepers would pay on average 175 Eurocents, a strikingly similar figure to the one 
stated by shopkeepers (shopkeepers know their customers well!). In the agreement 
cases, that is when the same P&B scehario is chosen by both parties10, shopkeepers 
accept to pay on average 72 cents. The bargaining area for shopkeepers’ contribution to 
the P&B cost financing can consequently be estimated to be between 68 and 175 
Eurocents. 
 
b) Costs to be borne by customers. On average, in the first task (second row and first 
column of table 1, choice task 1), shopkeepers stated that customers should contribute 
139 Eurocents per parcel for the P&B service. They also expect that their customer 
would most likely want to contribute a cost equal to 29 Eurocents (second row and 
second column of table 1, choice task 1). The analysis of the choice tasks stated by 
customers, in fact, shows that they are willing to contribute on average 28 Eurocents 
(again, shopkeepers know their customers well!). The P&B alternatives chosen by both 
parties are those in which customers pay on average 46 Eurocents. The bargaining area 
for customers’ contribution to the P&B cost financing can consequently be estimated to 
be between 28 and 139 Eurocents. 
 
c) Maximum delivery time at the parking lot. On average, in the first task, 
shopkeepers stated that a parcel should be delivered at the parking lot within 60 
minutes. They also stated that their customers would most likely want a parcel to be 
delivered in 45 minutes. The analysis of the choice tasks, however, shows that 
shopkeepers are willing to accept an average time of 109 minutes and customers a 
surprisingly higher time of 117 minutes. When a P&B alternative is chosen by both 
parties the delivery time is on average equal to 103 minutes. The bargaining area for the 
delivery timing can consequently be estimated to be between 60 to 117 minutes, as 
customers appear to be less demanding then it is perceived by the shopkeepers. 
 
 
4. Econometric results 
 
The stated preference data of shopkeepers and of their customers have been used to 
separately estimate two different logit models, one for each group, hence the initial pass 
power model has been estimated. 
 
The shopkeepers’ choice model 
 
None of the shopkeepers participating to the SP experiment (19 out of 2111) refused to 
begin the negotiation process, that is chose the third alternative described in table 1. The 
estimates of the parameters of the binomial logit model based on their choices are 
reported in table 2. 
                                                 
10
 Out of the 266 tasks (14 tasks times 19 interviews), in 53 of them the customer chooses the same 
alternative chosen by the shopkeeper without having previous information on the latter’s choice. 
11
 Two shopkeepers asserted that P&B service was unsuitable for their business, hence they did not 
provide the necessary starting values for designing the experiment.  
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Table 2: The shopkeepers’ choice model. 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics 
Alternative specific constant 0.102 0.37 
Cost to be charged to the shopkeeper -3.319 -5.70 
Cost to be charged to the customer -0.640 -1.68 
Maximum delivery time at the parking lot -0.012 -3.60 
Use of information technology 0.361 1.27 
Extra-cost to be charged to the shopkeeper for a destination other 
than the parking lot -0.871 -2.23 
Extra-cost to be charged to customers for a destination other than 
the parking lot 0.698 2.15 
Notes: N. obs.: 266; LL(B)= -74.03; Adjusted Pseudo R2 (no coefficients)=0.40851. 
 
The overall performance of the model is quiet good. The most significant parameter is 
the service cost to be borne by shopkeepers, and, as expected, it has a negative sign. 
Maximum delivery time at the parking lot has also a negative effect on shopkeepers’ 
utility function. They probably perceived that the quickness of the service would 
increase the competitiveness of the stores located in the city center. Surcharges for 
parcels to be delivered at destinations other then the parking lot positively affect 
shopkeepers’ utility function if this extra service is paid by customers, the opposite if 
the shopkeepers have to pay for them. The parameter of the customers’ contribution to 
the cost of the P&B service has a negative sign, most likely because shopkeepers 
believe that it would reduce their competitiveness, but this estimate has limited 
statistical significance. Finally the use of information technology is viewed positively, 
but the estimate of this parameter is characterized by low statistical significance. 
 
The customers’ choice model 
 
Since during the SP experiment some customers chose the third alternative, that is 
they refused both the proposed hypothetical P&B services, we decided to use a nested 
logit in order to model their behaviour. Specifically, we structured the model as tree 
composed by two branches: a branch, with two twigs, describing the choice between the 
hypothetical P&B services, and a degenerate branch (single twig) describing the choice 
of not participating to the P&B service (figure 1). 
The result is a highly significant model according to which customers are particularly 
sensitive to the P&B cost which, according to their preferences, should be paid by the 
shopkeepers. All the other variables are not significant, including, quite surprisingly, the 
maximum delivery time at the parking lot. 
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Table 3: The customers' choice model. 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics 
Alternative specific constant 6.700 1.87 
Cost to be charged to the shopkeeper 3.925 1.93 
Cost to be charged to the customer -3.427 -1.91 
Maximum delivery time at the parking lot 0.003 0.45 
Use of information technology -0.829 -1.09 
Extra-cost to be charged to the shopkeeper for a destination other 
than the parking lot 1.492 1.47 
Extra-cost to be charged to customers for a destination other than 
the parking lot 0.634 0.87 
No-service alternative specific constant 20.867 0.24 
IV parameters   
SI 2.45 2.05 
B(1|1,1) 2.29 .240 
Notes: N. obs.: 266; LL(B)= -15.37; Adjusted Pseudo R2 (no coefficients)= 0.88389. 
 
The initial pass power model 
 
On the bases of the coefficients estimated for the shopkeepers and for the customers 
with the models previously described, and following the MIGI methodology, we have 
estimated an initial pass power model. 
For this estimation we used only the tasks where one of the hypothetical P&B services 
were chosen, excluding, thereof, 12 tasks in which customers chose the “non-option”, 
that is the third alternative in table1. As stated by Hensher and Puckett (2006) the initial 
pass power model can be estimated considering: a) all the choice tasks, independently of 
the fact that both parties choose the same alternative or not (complete first pass model), 
or b) only those choice tasks in which the two parties choose the same alternative 
(restricted first pass model). 
The estimation of the parameters of the complete first pass model, that is the τs in 
equations 2, produced the following results: 
According to the model specification, a coefficient τ larger than 0.5 signals that 
shopkeepers exert a stronger influence then their customers on the value of the attributes 
characterizing the P&B service, while a τ smaller than 0.5 signals a stronger influence 
of customers. As in Hensher and Puckett (2006), and contrarily to the theory, we 
consider “unbounded” τ parameters (they are free to exceed the 0-1 boundaries), 
because we assume that a party might trade off his influence on one attribute with its 
influence on another one. Hence, the interpretation of the results is the following. 
Shopkeepers retain control over their contribution to financing the service, but 
customers exert an even stronger influence on their contribution. Surprisingly, the 
quickness of the service is more influenced by shopkeepers rather than by customers. 
Such a result is consistent with what derived from the previous descriptive and 
analytical evidence of the data: quickness is not an important attribute for the sampled 
customers. 
Similarly, information technology is a feature deemed more important by shopkeepers 
than by customers. With reference to whom should pay for the extra-cost of home 
delivery, the estimates provide a balanced influence on shopkeepers contribution, 
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whereas customers contribution is very much influenced by shopkeepers preferences. 
Both results appear quite reasonable since the service under consideration is very much 
in the interest of the customers and, consequently, the parties favour a solution in which 
the extra-cost is borne by the customers. 
Table 4: Complete Initial Pass Power Model. 
Mean power measures τ (>0.5 represents relative power to 
shopkeeper, <0.5 represents relative power to customer) Coeficient t-ratio* 
Cost to be charged to the shopkeeper 0.808 2.12 
Cost to be charged to the customer -1.060 -4.11 
Maximum delivery time at the parking lot 1.163 2.43 
Use of information technology 0.979 1.44 
Extra-cost to be charged to the shopkeeper for a destination other 
than the parking lot 0.517 0.07 
Extra-cost to be charged to customers for a destination other than 
the parking lot 1.587 2.93 
Constant (shopkeeper chooses 1, customer chooses 1) -0.479 -2.50 
Constant (shopkeeper chooses 1, customer chooses 2) -0.619 -3.39 
Constant (shopkeeper chooses 2, customer chooses 1) -0.712 -2.90 
Notes: * The null hypothesis is H0:τ = 0.5. 
N.obs: 254; LL(B)= -100.11; Adjusted Pseudo R2 (no coefficients)= 0.71. 
 
In order to estimate the restricted version of the initial pass power model two sets of 
data are available: one including only the agreement choices and one which comprises 
those tasks where customers were willing to revise their first choice in order to reach an 
agreement with the shopkeepers. In our interviews both situations are not numerous. 
Out of 266 tasks, 53 resulted in immediate agreement, while 11 in situations where 
customers were willing to revise their choice and accept the shopkeepers’ choices. Since 
the data resulting from the first 53 tasks were not enough to estimate the model, this was 
estimated combining the initial and the subsequent agreement cases. 
Table 5: Restricted Initial Pass Power Model. 
Mean power measures (>0.5 represents relative power to 
shopkeeper, <0.5 represents relative power to customer) Coefficient t-ratio* 
Cost to be charged to the shopkeeper 0.476 -0.11 
Cost to be charged to the customer -0.838 -2.40 
Maximum delivery time at the parking lot 1.463 2.48 
Use of information technology   
Extra-cost to be charged to the shopkeeper for a destination other 
than the parking lot 0.134 -1.15 
Extra-cost to be charged to customers for a destination other than 
the parking lot 0.733 0.30 
Constant (shopkeeper chooses 1, customer chooses 1) -0.536 -2.20 
Constant (shopkeeper chooses 1, customer chooses 2) -2.446 -4.81 
Constant (shopkeeper chooses 2, customer chooses 1) -2.189 -3.81 
Notes: * The null hypothesis is H0:τ = 0.5. 
N. obs.: 64 choice tasks (53 first-agreement cases + 11 second-agreement cases); Information technology 
variable not considered; LL(B)= -42.24; Adjusted Pseudo R2 (no coefficients)= 0.50320. 
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The model could be estimated with all the variables used in the previous models 
except the use of information technology. The results are similar but not equivalent to 
the previous ones (those obtained with the complete version of the initial pass power 
model), demonstrating that the two models have a different meaning. 
They indicate that the shopkeepers’ contribution is equally influenced by the two 
parties, unlike the previous result. On the contrary, customers retain a great influence in 
determining their contribution. The quickness of the service is left to shopkeepers as in 
the previous model. The contribution to the extra-cost is influenced by customers in the 
case of shopkeepers’ contribution and vice-versa in the case of customers’ contribution. 
Unlike the previous results, customers are less willing to accept the surcharge for home 
delivery.  
 
The probability of agreement 
 
It is also interesting to estimate how attributes affect the probability of agreement 
between the two parties. It can be done using the information obtained from the tasks 
where an agreement (either direct or after concession by the customer) took place.. The 
alternatives are described by the attributes levels and the alternative chosen by both 
parties is set to 1. The model contains the same amount of information as the restrictive 




y j = α j + β ' X j + ε j  (4) 
 
Where yj is set to 1 when the alternative j is chosen by both parties and 0 otherwise. 
The results are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6: Probability of agreement. 
Variable Coeff. Std.Err. t-ratio 
Cost to be charged to the shopkeeper -6.367 3.367 -1.89 
Cost to be charged to the customer -8.508 3.169 -2.68 
Maximum delivery time at the parking lot -0.024 0.008 -2.90 
Use of information technology 0.645 0.606 1.06 
Extra-cost to be charged to the shopkeeper for a destination other 
than the parking lot 0.909 0.693 1.31 
Extra-cost to be charged to customers for a destination other than 
the parking lot 0.195 0.722 0.27 
Constant -0.454 0.603 -0.75 
Notes: N. obs.: 64 choice tasks (53 first-agreement cases + 11 second-agreement cases); LL(B)= -19.36; 
Adjusted Pseudo R2 (no coefficients)= 0.50. 
 
It turns out that the increase in the minutes within which the parcel is made available 
at the parking lot affects negatively and significantly the probability of both parties 
agreeing on choosing the alternative. Notice the high coefficients attached to the cost to 
be charged to the customers or to the shopkeepers. They are both negative meaning that 
an increase in cost has a negative impact on the probability of both parties agreeing on 
the alternative. Both variables have also high standard errors (because of the conflicting 
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interests among the two parties) resulting in low t-statistics. However, it turns out that 
the t-statistics (and also the coefficient) for the cost to be charged to the shopkeeper is 
actually lower than that of the customer, meaning that an increase in the cost to be 
charged to the shopkeepers affects less the probability of having an agreement then an 
increase in cost to be charged to the customers. All other variables are not statically 




In the descriptive results section the levels of the alternative preferred by the 
shopkeepers and by the customers were identified and discussed. They are summarised 
in the first three rows of Table 7. The remaining three variables are coded as dummies 
(meaning that both alternatives use of information technology, alternative A requires 
extra-cost to be charged to the customers and alternative B to the shopkeepers). How 
likely is that the alternative A and B so described are accepted relative to one another? 
The application of the coefficients estimated with the four models (the shopkeepers' 
choice model, the customers' choice model, the complete initial pass power model and 
the agreement-only initial pass power model) provides us with an estimate of their 
relative degree of acceptability. 









Cost to be charged to the shopkeeper 0.71 1.75 
Cost to be charged to the customer 1.39 0.28 
Maximum delivery time at the parking lot 109 117 
Use of information technology 1 1 
Extra-cost to be charged to the shopkeeper for other 
destinations  0 1 
Extra-cost to be charged to customers for other 
destinations 1 0 
   
Models: P(A) P(B) 
Shopkeepers' choice model 99% 1% 
Customers' choice model 0% 100% 
Complete initial pass power model 1% 99% 
Agreement-only initial pass power model 0% 100% 
 
It turns out that alternative A is highly preferred by shopkeepers, whereas it has no 
chance of been accepted by customers. The opposite is true for alternative B. This 
results is obvious since each party prefers his own alternative. But what about the 
dyad’s preferences. The complete and the agreement-only initial pass power model 
deem definitely more acceptable to the dyad the customers’ preferred alternative then 
the shopkeepers’ preferred alternative, meaning that the compromise solution deriving 
from a bargaining process would most likely be closer to alternative B than to 
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alternative A. But the model cannot tell us neither how close these alternative are to the 
compromise solution, nor which will be the compromise solution. 
 
Alternative specifications of the group utility function 
 
Because of limited sample size  we were able to estimate only the specification of 
equation 3 , those including the direct interaction terms (all but the one relative to cost 
to be charged to the shopkeepers).  
The model adopting the multi-linear specification of the group utility function 
(equation 3) is slightly superior to the linear utility model of equation 1. But none of the 
intra-group interaction parameter proves significant, although their signs are, in general, 
correct. A positive sign implies that the group utility  rises when one party systematic 
utility improves holding the other party’s utility constant (signalling positive group 
inter-dependence or complementarity). A negative sign implies that the group utility  
decreases when one party systematic utility improves holding the other party’s utility 
constant (signalling negative group inter-dependence or substitutability). The only 
interaction term with a positive sign is the quickness of the service, since both party 
profit from its increase. On the contrary, and not surprisingly, cost variables have a 
negative sign, signalling conflict. Surprisingly, the information technology interaction 
term has a negative sign as well. 
Table 8: The multi-linear group utility function. 
Mean power measures (>0.5 represents relative power to shopkeeper, 
<0.5 represents relative power to customer) 
Coeff. t-ratio* 
Cost to be charged to the shopkeeper 0.854 2.26 
Cost to be charged to the customer -1.117 -3.87 
Maximum delivery time at the parking lot 0.718 0.39 
Use of information technology -0.105 -0.74 
Extra-cost to be charged to the shopkeeper for a destination other than 
the parking lot 0.573 0.15 
Extra-cost to be charged to customers for a destination other than the 
parking lot 1.990 3.42 
Interaction term relative to the cost to be charged to the customer -0.340 -2.32 
Interaction term relative to the quickness of the service 1.114 0.45 
Interaction term relative to the use of information technology -3.852 -1.52 
Interaction term relative to extra-cost to be charged to the shopkeeper -0.096 -0.92 
Interaction term relative to extra-cost to be charged to the customer -1.869 -2.09 
Constant (shopkeeper chooses 1, customer chooses 1) -0.390 -2.15 
Constant (shopkeeper chooses 1, customer chooses 2) -0.443 -1.66 
Constant (shopkeeper chooses 2, customer chooses 1) -0.437 -1.58 
Notes: * The null hypothesis is H0:τ = 0.5. 
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5. Conclusions and future research agenda 
 
The paper analyses the potential for introducing an innovative city logistics service in 
the city of Pesaro (Italy), a P&B service along the lines of the pilot project introduced in 
Siena in 2004. The idea is to organize a service to deliver the parcels bought in the 
stores of the traffic-restricted city center to the parking lots where the customers are 
forced to leave their cars or where their coaches are parked. 
In order for the service to be successful, both shopkeepers and costumers need to be 
willing to use it and to share, at least partially, its costs. Furthermore, the characteristics 
of the service, that is quickness, use of ICT, destination to be served, etc., should be as 
much as possible consistent with the preferences of its users. 
This paper attempts to empirically evaluate the preferences of the parties involved in 
the P&B service via a stated preference experiment. Since the success or failure of this 
service is based on the interaction of at least two parties, shopkeepers and customers, 
group decision theory and group decision making models have been used to design the 
SP experiment and to analyze the data.  
Attribute levels are not pre-fixed by the researcher but set by the shopkeeper, with 
orthogonal variations on the base alternatives. The same experiment is then 
administered to his potential customers, without or with previous knowledge on the 
shopkeeper’s choice. 
The descriptive and econometric results show that most shopkeepers (19 out of 21) 
are interested in the implementation of the P&B service and are willing to make a 
proposal on its characteristics and cost distribution. Customers are also interested in the 
introduction of the new service.  
The two parties’ preferences about cost allocation, although, are, not surprisingly, 
quite different. While the shopkeepers’ willingness to contribute to the P&B costs 
ranges between 68 and 175 Eurocents, the customers’ willingness to pay ranges 
between 28 and 139 Eurocents. 60 to 117 minutes is the time within which a parcel 
should be made available at the parking lot. Table 9 represents a summary of the 
econometric results obtained. 
Table 9: Summary of econometric results. 
 Shopkeepers. Cust. Full PM Re. PM 
Variable β β τ τ 














Minutes within which the parcel should be 


































Note: t-stat in parentesis. 
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Independent discrete choice models, one for shopkeepers only and one for customers 
only, are estimated. The former indicates that shopkeepers regard their contribution to 
the service as the most decisive factor. They attribute importance to the quickness of the 
service as well as to the distribution of the surcharge for destinations other than the 
parking lot, which they deem should be borne by customers. To some surprise their 
customers’ contribution to the cost of the service enters negatively their utility function, 
so that they deem it should be reduced as much as possible, most likely because they 
fear an indirect negative effect on their business. 
Customers’ choice model is mainly determined by cost allocation. Contrary to the 
shopkeepers, the cost attributed to them affects negatively their utility function while 
that allocated to shopkeepers affects their function positively. Furthermore, they believe 
that the extra-costs of other than parking lot destinations should be borne by 
shopkeepers. 
In order to estimate the influence that their preference structure plays on the 
bargaining process, two types of initial-pass power models are estimated as proposed in 
the literature: a complete power model and an agreement-only power model. The former 
indicates that shopkeepers exert a greater control over their contribution to the financing 
of the service, the quickness of the delivery (to some surprise), the surcharge attributed 
to the customer and the use of information technology. Customers exert more influence 
on the share of their direct contribution only. The agreement-only power model offers a 
slightly different view. Shopkeepers loose control on their direct contribution, whereas 
customers retain theirs. It is confirmed that the timing of the delivery is influenced by 
shopkeepers, whereas customers push for a shopkeepers’ contribution to the extra-costs 
of home delivery and shopkeepers push for customers’ contribution. 
An enhanced version of the power model allowing the identification of potential 
altruistic effects did not detect any intra-group interaction effects. 
The data collected allowed us also to estimate the determinants of the probability of 
agreement. The results of our analysis show that the cost of the service, especially for 
the customers, and the quickness of the service negatively affects the probability of 
agreement. Information technology, on the contrary, does not seem to play a relevant 
role.  
Finally, a simulation was performed to estimate which of the alternatives preferred by 
shopkeepers and by customers were more able to succeed. Our analysis showed that the 
alternative proposed by customers is more likely to be closer to the final compromise 
solution, or, stated in other terms, shopkeepers seem more likely to concede to 
customers’ desires. However, the methodology is not able to forecast which will be the 
end result of the interaction process.  
To conclude, the paper presents a methodology to evaluate the potentialities of a new 
city logistics service. Although various theoretical and methodological issues are still 
open to discussion, the methodology demonstrates to be useful in providing insights  not 
only the parties’ preference structure as normally achieved by discrete choice models, 
but also on the shopkeepers perception of customers’ preferences, on the area of 
bargaining, on each party’s influence on the choice attributes and on the determinants of 
the probability of achieving a comprise solution. 
In future research we would like to extend the analysis to different cities both to 
enlarge the sample size and to verify if there are different perceptions in various parts of 
the country. A larger sample size should also allow us to estimate different functional 
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forms of equation 3 as well as to estimate a restricted power model with initial pass 
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